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Abstract
The recognition heuristic models the adaptive use and dominant role of recognition knowledge in judgment under
uncertainty. Of the several predictions that the heuristic makes, empirical tests have predominantly focused on the
proposed noncompensatory processing of recognition. Some authors have emphasized that the heuristic needs to be
scrutinized based on precise tests of the exclusive use of recognition. Although precise tests have clear merits, I critically
evaluate the value of such tests as they are currently employed. First, I argue that using precise measures of the exclusive
use of recognition has to go beyond showing that the recognition heuristic—like every model—cannot capture reality
completely. Second, I illustrate how precise tests based on response times can lead to unsubstantiated conclusions if
the fact that the recognition heuristic does not model the recognition judgment itself is ignored. Finally, I highlight two
key but so far neglected aspects of the recognition heuristic: (a) the connection between recognition memory and the
recognition heuristic; and (b) the mechanisms underlying the adaptive use of recognition.
Keywords: recognition heuristic, memory, noncompensatory, response times, ecological rationality.
“When I complain of my memory, they seem
not to believe I am in earnest, and presently re-
prove me as though I accused myself for a fool;
not discerning the difference between memory
and understanding. [E]xperience rather daily
showing us [. . . ] that a strong memory is com-
monly coupled with an infirm judgment.” (de
Montaigne, 1595/2003, p. 22)
1 Introduction
In his Essays, the French philosopher Michel de Mon-
taigne suggested that a good memory is not necessarily
coupled with good decision making. In fact, he seems
to imply that decisions can sometimes even benefit from
deficits in memory. How could this be possible? One
answer is that because structures in the mind often re-
flect meaningful regularities in the world (e.g., Anderson
& Schooler, 1991; Pachur, Schooler, & Stevens, in press),
blanks in memory can be exploited for making inferences
about the world.
The notion that judgments feed on dynamics in mem-
ory has been taken up in several models of decision
making. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1973)
proposed that the ease with which instances or occur-
rences can be brought to mind “is an ecologically valid
clue” (p. 209) about the world and that an availability
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heuristic based on this ease might operate when people
judge probability or frequency. More recently, Goldstein
and Gigerenzer (2002) described the recognition heuris-
tic as a model of how people recruit recognition mem-
ory when making inferences more generally. In con-
trast to the availability heuristic, the recognition heuris-
tic is a clearly specified computational model with pre-
cise search, stopping, and decision rules. Moreover, the
recognition heuristic was proposed as an adaptive mental
tool with specific boundary conditions (Gigerenzer, Todd,
& the ABC Research Group, 1999).1
The recognition heuristic makes several testable pre-
dictions about recognition and its use in decision making.
First, as the recognition heuristic is assumed to be eco-
logically rational (i.e., exploiting a regularity in the en-
vironment), recognition should be frequently correlated
with quantities in the world. Second, people’s use of
the recognition heuristic should be sensitive to the struc-
ture of the environment. Third, the recognition heuristic
predicts that recognition is processed in a noncompen-
satory fashion—that is, recognition should supersede fur-
ther cue knowledge. Finally, the heuristic predicts, under
certain conditions, a counterintuitive less-is-more effect,
where recognizing fewer objects can lead to more accu-
rate inferences than recognizing more objects. (For an
overview of tests of these predictions, see Pachur, Todd,
Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011.)
1The availability heuristic, by contrast, has often been criticized as
being only vaguely defined (e.g., Fiedler, 1983; Wallsten, 1983). More-
over, neither its boundary conditions nor its relationship to other heuris-
tics (such as representativeness; see Sherman & Corty, 1984) have been
specified (Gigerenzer, 1996).
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The precise definition of the recognition heuristic and
its assumed role as an adaptive mental tool made it an
attractive study object. Maybe not surprisingly, not all
empirical investigations have found evidence supporting
the heuristic. Of the several predictions that the heuristic
makes, it seems fair to say that the assumed noncompen-
satory processing of recognition has received the greatest
attention so far—and has generated the strongest objec-
tion (Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011;
Hilbig & Pohl, 2008, 2009; Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl,
2010; Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009; Hochman, Ayal,
& Glöckner, 2010; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Newell
& Shanks, 2004; Oeusoonthornwattana & Shanks, 2010;
Oppenheimer, 2003; Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008;
Pohl, 2006; Richter & Späth, 2006).
Some authors have emphasized the need for precise
tests of the recognition heuristic, and (a) developed pre-
cise measures of the exclusive use of recognition, argu-
ing that “precise models deserve precise measures” and
(b) conducted precise tests of the information processing
in recognition-based inference based on response times
(Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Hilbig, 2010a, 2010b; Hilbig,
Erdfelder, et al., 2010; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008, 2009; Hilbig
& Richter, 2011; Hilbig, Scholl, & Pohl, 2010). In the
following, I discuss the value of such precise tests as they
are currently used and argue that they have done little
to advance our understanding of recognition-based infer-
ence. In addition, I highlight two key issues underlying
the use of recognition in decision making that seem to
have been neglected as a result of the strong focus on
testing the noncompensatory processing of recognition.
First, we need to better understand the relationship be-
tween recognition as studied in the memory literature and
the recognition memory tapped by the recognition heuris-
tic. Second, I summarize proposals of how people might
adaptively adjust their reliance on recognition across dif-
ferent situations. Importantly, I do not argue that the de-
velopments of precise measures or demonstrations of the
recognition heuristic’s failure to predict data should be
ignored. Rather, I call for a more constructive way to use
these findings for refining models of memory-based deci-
sion making.
2 Why precise tests of the recogni-
tion heuristic are not always use-
ful
2.1 Precise measures of the exclusive use of
recognition
The key factor enabling the recognition heuristic’s eco-
logical rationality is that recognizing an object is often
correlated with other properties of the object and can thus
be used to infer these properties (Goldstein & Gigerenzer,
2002). Moreover, recognition often correlates with other
cues (Marewski & Schooler, 2011). To illustrate, a rec-
ognized city is often more populous than an unrecognized
one and it is also more likely to have a university or an in-
ternational airport (both of which also predict city size).
This collinearity between cues is a common situation in
the real world and it is also key to Brunswik’s (1952) no-
tion of vicarious functioning. Moreover, Davis-Stober,
Dana, and Budescu (2010) have shown that under condi-
tions of collinearity, restricting search to only one cue (as
proposed by the recognition heuristic) can actually repre-
sent the optimal strategy to make inferences.
However, the fact that recognition is often correlated
with other cues also makes it difficult to rigorously test
the recognition heuristic. Specifically, Hilbig and col-
leagues pointed out that high adherence rates—that is,
that people often infer a recognized object to have a
higher criterion value than an unrecognized one—do not
necessarily mean that people use the recognition heuris-
tic (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; Hilbig, Erdfelder, et al., 2010).
As recognition and other cues often hint at the same ob-
ject, people might have considered these cues as well
(inconsistent with the heuristic’s predicted noncompen-
satory processing of recognition). To address this prob-
lem, measures were developed that reflect the exclusive
reliance on recognition more precisely than the adherence
rate. For instance, Hilbig & Pohl’s (2008) discrimination
index (DI) expresses the degree to which the probability
that the decision maker chooses a recognized object dif-
fers between cases where recognition leads to a correct
(C) and cases where recognition leads to a false (F) re-
sponse (for a similar approach, see Pachur & Hertwig,
2006; Pachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009). The index is de-
fined as DI = p(chooseR|C) – p(chooseR|F). As the recog-
nition heuristic predicts that the decision maker ignores
further cue knowledge when making inferences within a
particular environment, DI should be zero. In various in-
vestigations, however, Hilbig and colleagues showed that
for most participants DI is larger than zero—even when
adherence rates are rather high.
In a further development, Hilbig, Erdfelder, et al.
(2010) proposed a multinomial measurement model (r-
model) that allows estimating the probability with which
the decision maker applies the recognition heuristic (i.e.,
processing recognition in a noncompensatory fashion) as
well as the probability that further cues are inspected.2
The model also allows to disentangle systematic and un-
systematic (i.e., use of further cues vs. guessing) factors
underlying the nonreliance on the recognition heuristic.
In applications of the r-model, Hilbig, Erdfelder, et al.
2For a comparison of various approaches to measure the use of the
recognition heuristic, such as adherence rates, DI, and the r-model, see
Hilbig (2010a).
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showed that the probability that participants strictly fol-
low recognition is often considerably lower than if con-
sidering adherence rates only. It was concluded that, in-
consistent with the prediction of the recognition heuristic,
“information integration beyond recognition plays a vital
role” (p. 123).
Clearly, these results demonstrate that people do not al-
ways strictly adhere to the recognition heuristic and that
this is not merely due to unsystematic factors (i.e., guess-
ing or inattention). Rather, violations of the heuristic’s
predictions are often systematic, indicating that at least
some people do not always ignore useful information be-
yond recognition. This may suggest that the noncom-
pensatory recognition heuristic is a less adequate model
than a compensatory strategy, which integrates several
cues; and some authors have concluded that “any theory
of comparative judgment must allow for use of further
knowledge of information in recognition cases” (Hilbig,
Erdfelder, et al., 2010, p. 132). However, a comparison
of the recognition heuristic with various compensatory
models showed that, although the recognition heuristic
does not predict the data perfectly, it still provides the
best account currently available (Marewski, Gaissmaier,
Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010).
How then should we evaluate the violations of the
recognition heuristic’s predictions as revealed by pre-
cise measures of the exclusive use of recognition (Hilbig
& Pohl, 2008; Hilbig & Richter, 2011)? In my view,
Marewski et al.’s (2010) results underline the limited
value of using highly precise measures as applied in tests
by Hilbig and Pohl (2009) and Hilbig, Erdfelder, et al.
(2010). In fact, one way to interpret Hilbig, Erdfelder,
et al.’s critical results for the recognition heuristic is that
they remind us of the fact that the recognition heuristic
merely models and therefore simplifies reality. But such
an insight is not very useful if it remains unclear how ex-
actly the recognition heuristic fails to capture the decision
making process—and how to model the cognitive process
instead. (In the next section, I discuss candidate mecha-
nisms that might underlie people’s decision to suspend
the recognition heuristic.) Without doubt, high precision
in measurement is a useful goal to advance understanding
of a phenomenon. The proposed precise measures of the
use of the recognition heuristic (i.e., DI and the r-model,
as well as Pachur & Hertwig’s, 2006, d’) therefore repre-
sent important progress over simple adherence rates and
clearly should be used when investigating, for instance,
adaptive changes or individual differences in the use of
the heuristic (e.g., Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pachur et
al., 2009). However, the development of more precise
measures should go hand in hand with the development
of more precise and accurate models and should not stop
with demonstrations that a model somehow fails to pre-
dict some data.
Note that this issue is not restricted to the recognition
heuristic. At least for models in the behavioral sciences,
given precise enough measures violations can probably
be found for every model ever proposed. For instance,
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), one of
the most prominent models of risky choice, has clearly
been rejected by some data (e.g., Birnbaum & Chavez,
1997; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; for an
overview, see Birnbaum, 2008). Nevertheless, prospect
theory still proves useful for investigating and quantify-
ing risky choice (e.g., Pachur, Hanoch, & Gummerum,
2010) and continues to stimulate new challenges (Brand-
stätter et al., 2006). Similarly, in classification research,
I am not aware of a model that does not fail to account
for some data given sufficiently precise measures (for an
overview, see Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004). Nevertheless ex-
emplar models, prototype models, and rule-based models
(as well as combinations thereof) still offer useful frame-
works for understanding how people structure objects in
the world.
To summarize: developing precisely formulated cog-
nitive models is an important goal for understanding be-
havior. Therefore, a precise computational model like the
recognition heuristic is easier to test than a vaguely de-
scribed model like the availability heuristic. Neverthe-
less, higher precision in modeling also exacts a price: a
precise model will be easier to falsify than a vague model,
and the falsification will be more likely the more pre-
cise the measures used. Therefore, to retain the purpose
of modeling, refinement in measurement should be ac-
companied by advancing model development. Refuting
a model does not automatically confirm alternative but
unspecified and untested models. Importantly, once an
alternative model has been proposed, its descriptive su-
periority has to be demonstrated in a comparative test
against the “null” model (see Brighton & Gigerenzer,
2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Marewski et al.,
2010). Although—as I have argued—precise measures
can be of only limited value in isolated tests of a model,
precise measures may be more useful in the context of
such comparative tests.
Finally, let us not forget that descriptive adequacy,
though a central dimension for model evaluation, is not
the only one. For instance, Shiffrin, Lee, Kim, and Wa-
genmakers (2008) highlighted that, in addition to achiev-
ing a “basic level of descriptive adequacy” (p. 1249), a
good model should provide insight, facilitate generaliza-
tion, direct new empirical explorations, and foster the-
oretical progress. Demonstrations that the recognition
heuristic cannot capture reality perfectly scarcely impair
the achievements of the heuristic on these dimensions
(e.g., predicting the less is more effect, modeling ecolog-
ical rationality), though theory development should not
stop there.
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2.2 Response time tests of the recognition
heuristic
The recognition heuristic models inferences from mem-
ory, that is, when cue values have to be retrieved from
memory. Although search processes in memory are not
amenable to direct observation, it has been proposed
that they are nevertheless reflected in response time pat-
terns (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Pachur & Her-
twig, 2006; Sternberg, 1966). Accordingly, one could
argue that precise tests of the recognition heuristic should
test the implications of the assumed limited informa-
tion search for response times. However, as criticized
by some (e.g., Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas,
2008), when proposing the recognition heuristic, Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer (2002) did not provide a model of
the recognition process and its temporal dynamics. As I
illustrate next, this omission may not only miss an oppor-
tunity for theory integration (Dougherty et al., 2008; Kat-
sikopoulos, 2010; Pachur, 2010; Pleskac, 2007; Schooler
& Hertwig, 2005). Rather, neglecting the dynamics of
the recognition process can also limit the value of precise
response time tests of the recognition heuristic.
Based on Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) descrip-
tion of the recognition heuristic, Hilbig and Pohl (2009;
see also Glöckner & Bröder, 2011) derived and tested
several response time predictions of the recognition
heuristic. For instance, response times should be faster
when a recognized object is compared to an unrecog-
nized object than when two recognized objects are com-
pared. Further, when a recognized object is compared to
an unrecognized object, the response time should be un-
affected by (a) the amount of cue knowledge available for
the recognized object, and (b) whether recognition leads
to a correct or an incorrect decision. The predictions are
based on the premise that response times in recognition-
based inference provide a pure measure of the amount
of processed cue information. Contradicting these de-
rived predictions, in empirical tests Hilbig and Pohl did
not find that people’s response times were consistently
faster when only one rather than both objects were rec-
ognized. Moreover, response times were faster for recog-
nized objects for which additional knowledge was avail-
able compared to recognized objects for which no addi-
tional knowledge was available. From these results, the
authors concluded that “support was obtained for the in-
tegration of information and the impact of differences in
evidence between objects. Decision times . . . supported
the notion that the (speed of the) decision process is de-
termined by the degree to which one object is superior
and thus by the degree of conflict rather than by recog-
nition alone.” (p. 1303) They argued that the observed
patterns are more in line with compensatory, “evidence
accumulation” models.3
But does it make sense to derive and test response-time
predictions from a model that does not account for the
recognition process? It is well established that the tem-
poral dynamics of the recognition process itself are sensi-
tive to various factors, such as word frequency and word
length (e.g., O’Regan & Jacobs, 1992). Moreover, the
amount of time required for a recognition judgment—i.e.,
fluency—might depend strongly on the decision maker’s
certainty in the recognition judgment. Erdfelder, Küpper-
Tetzel, and Mattern (2011) showed that a model that in-
tegrates the dynamics of the recognition process with the
recognition heuristic can account for response time pat-
terns that Hilbig and Pohl (2009) interpreted as evidence
against the recognition heuristic. To model the recogni-
tion process, Erdfelder et al. used a two-high threshold
model (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; see also Bröder &
Schütz, 2009). According to the model, fluency is mainly
a function of the “memory state” of the decision maker—
that is, how certain she is that the object was encoun-
tered before. Fluency is highest under certainty and low-
est under uncertainty, where the recognition judgments
concerning the recognized and the unrecognized objects
are based on guessing.
How could Erdfelder et al.’s model (2011)—
integrating the recognition heuristic with a two-high
threshold memory model—account for the finding that
the time people take to choose a recognized object varies
as a function of whether they have additional knowledge
or not—even if this additional knowledge is ignored? The
main reason is that, in the real world, people’s memory
state of an object—and by implication the fluency of the
object’s name—is strongly correlated with the availabil-
ity of further knowledge about the object (Marewski &
Schooler, 2011). Moreover, fluency is often correlated
with the criterion (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer,
2008). As a result, a person is more likely to recognize
those objects swiftly (a) about which she can retrieve fur-
ther knowledge and (b) that score high on the criterion.
People may thus decide faster because they recognize the
object faster—and not because of less conflict during the
inference process (as argued by Hilbig & Pohl, 2009). In
other words, the observation that recognition-based re-
sponses are faster when they are correct or when addi-
tional knowledge about the recognized object is available
does not necessarily mean that recognition was used in a
compensatory fashion. Finally, Erdfelder et al.’s model
can also account for the finding that response times in
cases in which only one object is recognized are not con-
sistently faster than in cases in which both objects are
recognized.
3Note that compensatory models can differ considerably in their pro-
cessing assumptions and predicted decisions, making it rather uninfor-
mative to collapse them all (e.g., Rieskamp, 2008).
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Figure 1: Response times in Pachur, Bröder, and
Marewski (2008; Experiments 1–3 collapsed), sepa-
rately for participants classified as compensatory users
or noncompensatory users of recognition. Shown are the
marginal estimated means (based on response times z-
standardized for each participant), controlling for the flu-
ency of the recognized and unrecognized objects.
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Taken together, combining the recognition heuristic
with an established model of the recognition process re-
veals that response time patterns that have been inter-
preted as supporting compensatory processes can be fully
consistent with a noncompensatory use of recognition
(see Erdfelder et al., 2011, pp. 18–19). Precise tests of
the recognition heuristic can thus be misleading if the
precision of the test is not matched to the precision (or
completeness) of the model. For a derivation of response
time predictions for the recognition heuristic based on
the ACT-R architecture, see Marewski and Mehlhorn (in
press).
Admittedly, Hilbig and Pohl (2009; Experiment 3) at-
tempted to control for possible differences in fluency in
one experiment, and repeated their analyses based on
residual response times (after regressing response times
on fluency). They found that, on the aggregate level,
similar patterns emerged as when fluency was not con-
trolled for. It is well known, however, that analyses on
the aggregate level can hide substantial individual differ-
ences in strategy use. Several studies have shown that,
even if only a small proportion of participants choose
systematically differently as predicted by the recognition
heuristic, the pattern on the aggregate level can contra-
dict the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
2011; Pachur et al., 2008). This also holds for response
time data. As a reanalysis of data reported by Pachur
et al. reveals, response time patterns can differ consider-
ably between different strategy users. As shown in Figure
1, for 51 of the 105 participants included in the analy-
sis who were classified as not following the recognition
heuristic (for details see Pachur et al., 2008, p. 203–204),
the response times (controlling for fluency) were con-
siderably faster when there was less conflicting knowl-
edge (i.e., many cues supporting recognition) compared
to when there was more conflicting knowledge (in the ex-
periments, participants always had three additional cues,
which either supported or contradicted recognition). For
the 54 participants classified as following the recognition
heuristic (because they always chose the recognized ob-
ject), by contrast, this trend was considerably attenuated
(although it did not disappear completely). Focusing on
the aggregate level only might thus lead to the erroneous
conclusion that the response-time patterns of all partici-
pants were strongly affected by the amount of conflicting
knowledge.
3 Neglected issues in studying
recognition-based inference
Without doubt, the thesis that recognition supersedes ad-
ditional cue knowledge is a strong prediction. It may
therefore not seem too surprising that a large propor-
tion of empirical tests have focused on this aspect of the
recognition heuristic. However, the recognition heuris-
tic offers a much richer conceptual framework for study-
ing adaptive decision making. Moreover, it provides
a great opportunity for bridging memory and decision-
making research (e.g., Dougherty, Gronlund, & Gettys,
2003; Weber, Goldstein, & Barlas, 1995; see Tomlinson,
Marewski, & Dougherty, 2011). In the following, I high-
light two important aspects of the recognition heuristic
that seem to have been overlooked as a result of the over-
whelming attention to the predicted noncompensatory
processing: (a) the connection between research on the
recognition heuristic and research on recognition mem-
ory, and (b) the mechanisms underlying people’s adaptive
use of the recognition heuristic.
3.1 Different types of recognition memory
Above I have illustrated how ignoring the processes un-
derlying the recognition judgment can make precise tests
of the recognition heuristic based on response times
rather uninformative. But the need to better understand
the contribution of recognition memory to recognition-
based inference goes further. For instance, Pleskac
(2007) found in mathematical analyses that the accuracy
of recognition memory should play a crucial role in the
performance of the recognition heuristic (i.e., the recog-
nition validity). In a study comparing recognition-based
inferences by young and older adults, however, Pachur et
al. (2009) found no association between the accuracy of
people’s recognition memory and their individual recog-
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nition validity. This discrepancy suggests that the type
of recognition memory usually studied in the memory lit-
erature might differ from the type of recognition mem-
ory tapped by the recognition heuristic. In common mea-
sures of recognition memory, participants are first asked
to study a list of known words and are later asked to dis-
criminate these studied words from other known words
that were not studied. This episodic recognition thus re-
quires the recollection of contextual information (such as
source, time and place, feelings) about previous encoun-
ters (see Neely & Payne, 1983; Tulving, 1972). Semantic
recognition, by contrast, which is crucial for tasks such
as lexical decisions (e.g., Scarborough, Cortese, & Scar-
borough, 1977) relies on context-independent features. It
is possible that the two types of recognition memory play
different roles in the use of recognition in decision mak-
ing. For instance, semantic recognition might be crucial
for distinguishing previously seen from novel objects,
whereas the ability for episodic recognition might be key
for evaluating whether using recognition in a particu-
lar situation is appropriate or not (Hertwig et al., 2008;
Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigeren-
zer, 2009; Volz et al., 2006; for a discussion, see Pachur et
al., 2009). A stronger connection to concepts in the mem-
ory literature could thus be helpful for research on the
recognition heuristic, leading to better understanding the
role of recognition in recognition-based inference and, in
particular, to better explanations of individual differences
in the use of the recognition heuristic.
3.2 The adaptive use of recognition
How do people decide whether to follow the recognition
heuristic or not? Although a central question for the no-
tion that the recognition heuristic is an adaptive tool, it
has received relatively little attention so far. In one of
the few studies examining the mechanisms underlying the
adaptive use of recognition directly, Pachur and Hertwig
(2006) tested three different hypotheses. According to
the threshold hypothesis, people’s reliance on the recog-
nition heuristic in a particular environment depends on
whether the recognition validity exceeds a certain thresh-
old or not. According to the matching hypothesis, people
follow the heuristic with a probability that matches their
individual recognition validity. According to the suspen-
sion hypothesis, the nonuse of the recognition heuristic
results from object-specific knowledge, rather than being
directly linked to the recognition validity (which is the
same for all objects in an environment). Pachur and Her-
twig found that the individual adherence rates were un-
correlated with the individual recognition validities (see
also Pohl, 2006), inconsistent with both the matching and
the threshold hypotheses. Supporting the suspension hy-
pothesis, however, the degree to which participants fol-
lowed recognition varied considerably across the differ-
ent objects (focusing, of course, on those cases where the
object was recognized). This suggests that the decision
of whether to use the recognition heuristic or not is made
for each individual pair of objects rather than for an entire
environment.
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that across differ-
ent environments, people follow the recognition heuristic
more when the recognition validity in an environment is
high compared to when it is low (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
2011; Pachur et al., 2011). It thus seems that the question
of adaptivity can be posed on two levels: First, within an
environment, is it useful to follow recognition in a partic-
ular pair of objects? Second, is the recognition heuristic
an appropriate tool in a particular environment? Pachur et
al. (2009) referred to these two levels as item adaptivity
and environment adaptivity, respectively. In the follow-
ing, I discuss what mechanisms might give rise to item
and environmental adaptivity.
3.2.1 Item adaptivity
The results of Pachur and Hertwig (2006) indicated that
reliance on the recognition heuristic is based on object-
specific information. What might the information be
that people recruit to evaluate the adequacy of using
the recognition heuristic? One possibility is recognition
speed (i.e., fluency). There are at least two reasons why
fluency might be a useful indicator for the appropriate-
ness of following recognition. First, as fluency is often
correlated with the criterion (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2008),
following recognition when the recognized object was
recognized swiftly should, ceteris paribus, lead to more
correct decisions than when the recognized object was
recognized slowly (see Marewski et al., 2010). Second,
as outlined by Erdfelder et al. (2011), fluency might indi-
cate the certainty (and thus accuracy) of the recognition
judgment—that is, whether the object was indeed previ-
ously encountered or not.
An alternative possibility is that additional cue
knowledge—rather than being used directly to make an
inference—is used as a “meta-cue” to decide whether to
use or to suspend the recognition heuristic. For illustra-
tion, consider a person is asked to judge whether Cher-
nobyl or an unrecognized Russian city is larger. Be-
cause the person knows that Chernobyl is well known
due to a nuclear disaster, she might suspend the recog-
nition heuristic in that particular case and choose the un-
recognized city (see Oppenheimer, 2003). A third pos-
sibility is that processes of source monitoring (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1991)
influence the decision of whether to follow recognition
or not. Specifically, one might infer simply from one’s
ability to retrieve specific knowledge about the source of
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 5, July 2011 Limited value of precise tests 419
an object’s recognition—for instance, that a city is rec-
ognized from a friend’s description of a trip—that recog-
nition is an unreliable cue in this case. Why? One indi-
cation that recognition is a potentially valid predictor is
when an object is recognized after encountering it multi-
ple times in many different contexts (e.g., hearing a name
in several conversations with different people, or across
various media), rather than through one particular, possi-
bly biased source. Thus, being able to easily think of one
particular source could indicate unreliability. Conversely,
if an object has appeared in many different contexts, re-
trieving information about any specific context is more
difficult and associated with longer retrieval times than
when an object has appeared in only one particular con-
text (known as the “fan effect”—Anderson, 1974). As
a consequence, difficulty in retrieving detailed informa-
tion concerning a particular context in which an object
was encountered could indicate that recognition has been
produced by multiple sources and is therefore an ecolog-
ically valid cue (see Pachur et al., 2011).
3.2.2 Environment adaptivity
As mentioned above, the average adherence rate in an en-
vironment usually follows the average recognition valid-
ity rather closely (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Pachur
et al., 2009, 2011). How do people achieve this appar-
ent adaptive use of the recognition heuristic? Given that
within an environment individual recognition validities
are uncorrelated with individual adherence rates (Pachur
& Hertwig, 2006; Pohl, 2006), individual learning seems
an unlikely factor. What are the alternatives? One possi-
bility is that the mechanisms underlying item adaptivity
and environment adaptivity are closely connected. For
instance, if the fluency of recognized objects tends to be
lower and discrediting cue or source knowledge is more
likely to be prevalent in environments with a low than
in those with a high recognition validity, item adaptivity
might lead to environment adaptivity. Another possibility
is that people have subjective theories about the predic-
tive power of recognition in different environments and
adjust their reliance based on these beliefs (e.g., Wright
& Murphy, 1984). Although these theories may not al-
ways be correct, they could nevertheless capture relative
differences in recognition validity between environments
rather well.
Taken together, because tests of the recognition heuris-
tic have been primarily concerned with testing the pre-
dicted noncompensatory processing, we know relatively
little about the principles underlying people’s decision to
use or suspend the recognition heuristic. Nevertheless,
from the little we know, the emerging picture suggests
that there are actually many different reasons—rather
than only one reason—for people to discard the recog-
nition heuristic and use alternative strategies instead.
4 Conclusion
Consistent with other models of decision heuristics, the
recognition heuristic assumes limited search and non-
compensatory processing. Clever empirical tests based
on precise measures of noncompensatory processing have
shown that this assumption is sometimes violated. Should
we therefore retire the recognition heuristic, as some have
demanded? I have argued for a more cautious and con-
structive approach to testing the recognition heuristic. In
fact, it is not surprising that the recognition heuristic can-
not capture all the data. Like every model, it is a simpli-
fication of reality and thus wrong. Mere demonstrations
that a model deviates from reality are not very helpful to
advance science. What is required in addition is a new (or
modified) model that can accommodate the violations of
the rejected model. Moreover, given that the recognition
heuristic as proposed by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002)
does not provide a complete account of cognition (e.g.,
by not modeling the recognition process), highly precise
tests can yield rather ambiguous results. Although it is
violated by some data, the recognition heuristic is, in my
view, currently still the best model we have available to
predict people’s recognition-based inferences. And hav-
ing an imperfect model is clearly better than having no
model at all (or only a vague one). When considering pos-
sible alternative models, it should also not be overlooked
that recognition-based inference can probably only be un-
derstood if we continue to focus on the close link be-
tween the mind and the environment. Only then can we
further refine our understanding why, as Montaigne ob-
served, failures in memory can actually be beneficial for
making good judgments.
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